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Abstract 
PARTICIPATION IN CALIFORNIA’S FOREST CARBON OFFSET PROGRAM: 
 MOTIVATIONS AND BARRIERS 
 
Celina Szymanski 
B.S., Frostburg State University  
M.A., Appalachian State University  
 
 
Chairperson: Tatyana Ruseva  
 
 
  The State of California has the most comprehensive climate change policy in 
 the United States in the form of a cap and trade program.  The program has received 
 international attention as a potential model for government-driven mitigation 
 strategies.  Within the program is a carefully constructed forest carbon offset 
 component.  Although the program is still relatively new, continuing analyses can 
 assist in providing feedback for improving the program and for highlighting 
 exemplary features that can be used by other programs in their formative stages.  This 
 work investigates the forest offset protocols where there are low rates of 
 participation. Interviews and surveys provide a basis for understanding the 
 motivations for entry and the barriers to participation landowners face in registering a 
 project into California’s forest carbon offset program. Six major criteria for credits 
 are discussed (real, enforceable, verifiable, additional, permanent, and quantifiable) 
 and preliminary findings suggest that the most serious barriers are the long time 
 commitment, the high cost of entry coupled with a low-rate of return, and competing 
v	
 environmental programs. Finally, recognizing the ultimate goal of mitigating the 
 effects of climate change, commentary about perceived barriers and 
 recommendations for reducing barriers is included.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Now that scientific consensus has been reached on the fact that climate change is a 
real and serious concern, policy decisions regarding exactly how to handle the problem need 
to be made. Despite some proposals, no policy decisions have been made at the federal level 
nor are there pending proposals that appear imminent.  One potential proposal was The 
American Clean Energy and Security Act, which would have created a national level 
economy-wide greenhouse gas (GHG) cap and trade system. This bill passed in the House 
but died in the Senate of the 111th Congress.  
In response, states and regions have taken on the task of addressing mitigation 
strategies without the umbrella of the federal government. There is currently budding policy 
in the northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states collaborating on the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI) which seeks to limit the amount of carbon output from nine states 
(Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, 
Rhode Island, and Vermont). Statewide, California has passed and implemented the Global 
Warming Solutions Act of 2006, which seeks to reduce emissions to the 1990 level by the 
year 2020 and to 80% below 1990 levels by 2050 (California Air Resources Board 2015b).  
A number of policy solutions have been offered as to exactly how to decrease net 
GHG emissions, among which is the market-based approach of cap and trade.  A cap and 
trade system is a market-based public policy developed to create a market for one of the 
world’s most important pollutants: carbon dioxide. The government sets the limit on an 
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acceptable level (cap) of emissions and then decreases that limit every year.  Regulated 
entities are then obligated to either (a) reduce their carbon dioxide emissions or (b) buy, sell, 
or bank emissions permits (trade) to stay within their prescribed limit.1 The cap need only be 
met on a macro level. Therefore, regulated entities, including most of the power sector such 
as petroleum refineries, electric power distributors, and fossil fuel power generators, may 
trade allowances or permits to meet their own necessary reductions in the most efficient way 
possible. In comparison to other environmental policies, cap and trade is cost-efficient, 
making it a pragmatic political solution.  It also presents a win-win situation for both 
government and the covered entities. The same amount of emissions reductions are achieved 
as if the government had set a command-and-control2 regulation, however the means of 
staying within the cap are left to the covered entities and the demands of the market.  
Cullenward (2014) offers the analogy of a game of musical chairs. In the analogy of 
the popular children’s game, each emitting firm is a player in the game. The government is 
the person in charge of the game who removes one chair each round and slowly the 
emissions are reduced over time.  The yearly decrease in allowable emissions levels and the 
flexibility in how entities achieve their net reductions allow the market to successfully 
regulate emission levels.   
With the implementation of comprehensive climate change legislation, California is 
leading the way for other states, regions, and countries who are setting up their own carbon 
markets as a test case. The successes and failures experienced in the California compliance 
market will likely influence the design of future markets. The world is watching.  
																																								 																					
1 One carbon dioxide permit equals one metric ton of carbon dioxide emissions (MTCO2e). 
2 Command- and-control regulations refer to a traditional method of environmental policy popular in the U.S. in 
the 1960s and 70s wherein the government sets a limit and industry is legally bound to comply with the 
standard.		
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One way of combating climate change is to not necessarily pollute less but rather to 
find a better way for the environment to the handle that pollution. This can be done in forests 
through a process called carbon sequestration. This is the process by which forests act as 
sinks, housing carbon and thus preventing it from being emitted into the atmosphere. Forests 
with certain characteristics sequester more carbon, essentially preventing it from entering the 
atmosphere and contributing to climate change. By investing in forests and other land use 
changes, stakeholders can make changes in how we perceive forests.  
The method through which carbon sequestration is managed in the California cap and 
trade program is the carbon offset component (California Air Resources Board 2015b). 
Again, with the goal of efficiency, emitting firms may choose to meet their yearly levels of 
pollution reductions by purchasing carbon offset credits – the later cannot exceed more than 
8% of the annual emission reductions. Carbon offsets come in many forms including offsets 
for dairy digesters, the destruction of ozone depleting substances, methane capture, urban 
forests, and forestry (see Figure 1).  
The focus of this work will be on forest carbon offset credits, that is offset credits 
earned from forest management projects. The rationale behind this is that policymakers are 
creating an alternative to traditional forest management techniques by placing an actual 
monetary value on something – carbon sequestration by forestlands – that society values as a 
public good. Regulated entities that need to decrease their carbon dioxide emissions to 
comply with government regulations may purchase these carbon offsets to meet their own 
obligations. Offsets are a tradable credit representing the quantified, measured, and verified 
reduction of one metric ton of GHG emissions.  
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Figure 1: Cap and Trade Components 
 
To ensure they are under the cap, emitting entities may invest in technological innovation, purchase carbon 
offsets, or employ some other method. If they choose to use carbon offsetting to meet the allowance, dairy 
digesters, destruction of ozone depleting substances, methane capture, and urban forests also provide markets 
for carbon. 
 Despite two active years of implementation and an apparent win-win situation for the 
government and landowners, there are still low numbers of participants in the forest offset 
program. Therefore, there must be something limiting entry into the program. What might 
that something be? What are the barriers landowners face in listing a forest offset project 
under California’s forest offset project protocol? Furthermore, what were landowners’ initial 
motivations in registering a project? This paper will present the results of surveys and 
interviews with experts, verifiers, landowners, and registry representatives regarding their 
experiences with the program, their motivations for participating initially, and barriers or 
features of the program that cause concern. It concludes with some final thoughts on forest 
offset policy while offering suggestions for the next round of policymaking.  
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1.2 The Forest Offset Protocol 
 California’s Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, also known as AB32, aims to 
reduce the state’s GHG emissions by 2050 to 80% below 1990 level (California Air 
Resources Board 2015b). The California Air Resources Board (ARB), a division of the 
California Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), administers the program and provides 
support for forest projects and entities that are mandated to reduce their greenhouse gas 
emissions. The policy operates under two frameworks: regulatory and voluntary. The 
mandated components are the yearly reductions in carbon dioxide emissions, about 3% per 
year from 2015 to 2020.  A covered entity must reduce its carbon dioxide output, but the 
ways in which it chooses to do that can vary. Another viable option is to instead invest in 
carbon credits. The voluntary part of this operation comes from the viewpoint of a landowner 
initiating an offset project. The landowner may choose to voluntarily enter the forest carbon 
offset market. This means that the landowner will attempt to preserve and increase the carbon 
stocks in and derived from the trees in the project.  
  Once a landowner decides to participate in the forest offset program, a series of 
technical steps must be followed to ensure the forest will, in fact, sequester carbon. The 
project must be registered with one of three ARB-approved registries: the Carbon Action 
Reserve (CAR), the American Carbon Registry (ACR), and the Verified Carbon Standard 
(VCS). At this point, the project is no longer voluntary and is instead held accountable in the 
form of a contract.   
1.3 Forest Offset Projects 
According to ARB protocol, there are three types of projects that can qualify as forest 
carbon offset projects: avoided conversion, improved forest management, and reforestation. 
	 	 6 
	
In avoided conversion, an area that is already forested but is not yet protected is dedicated as 
continuous forest cover. In improved forest management projects, a forest is actively 
managed to maintain or increase carbon stocks of forested land relative to baseline levels. 
Reforestation projects involve restoring tree cover on land that is not at optimal stocking 
levels, including land that has been decimated by fire or land that was previously farmland.  
   
1.4 Six Criteria for Forest Offset Projects 
 In order for a forest carbon offset project to be legitimate, the credits it produces must 
conform to six criteria. Credits must be real, verifiable, quantifiable, enforceable, permanent 
and additional. The regulation provides tight standards for projects because it aims to ensure 
that only legitimate projects are credited. If projects that are illegitimate are credited, the cap 
is undermined and the purpose of the legislation (i.e., mitigate GHG emissions) is not met. 
Therefore, these high standards exist. The permanence and additionality standards are 
clouded in controversy and may pose serious barriers to potential participants. Many of these 
criteria are the results of lessons learned from other emissions trading models.  
 Real. For a project to be considered real, it must have GHG reduction that resulted 
from “a demonstrable action or set of actions, and are quantified using appropriate, accurate, 
and conservative methodologies that account for all GHG emissions sources…within the 
offset project boundary and account for uncertainty and the potential for activity-shifting 
leakage and market-shifting leakage” (California Air Resources Board 2015a, 50).  
 Verifiable. The verifiable standard comes into play at both the time of the initial 
accreditation period and intermittently throughout the next 100 years. A neutral third party 
verification body such as Environmental Services, Inc. or SCS Global Services must verify 
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the credits. The maximum amount of time between verifications, after the initial verification 
period, is six years.  
 Quantifiable. Credits must be quantifiable, meaning they must be measurable 
relative to the baseline. The methodology used in calculating the baseline must be reliable 
and replicable and account for uncertainty and leakage. Leakage is the notion that in a system 
without clear, closed boundaries unintended or secondary effects (e.g., double counting, land 
development or timber harvests on other forestlands) can undermine accurate carbon offset 
measurements. Another example of leakage is the notion that if there’s a farm that has been 
converted into a forest and entered into this program, the food that farm produced must still 
be grown somewhere.  
 Enforceable. The enforceability standard is important because it gives the ARB the 
authority to hold parties liable if any provisions are violated. Without the power to enforce 
this regulation, the ARB would merely be suggesting ways to improve carbon sequestration.  
 Permanent. The requirement that projects be permanent manifests itself in the length 
of time for which landowners must enter into the contract. The regulation requires that 
projects be under contract for 100 years. If reversals occur, mechanisms are in place to 
ensure that all credited reductions “endure for at least 100 years” (California Air Resources 
Board 2015a, 42). This notion of permanence will be further discussed below.  
 Additional. Finally, projects must be additional. Additionality essentially asks 
whether the project would have happened without the policy. If the answer to that question is 
“yes,” then the project is not additional. Additional projects are not simply conforming to the 
law or other regulations. Instead, the driving actor behind the change in a landowner’s 
behavior must be directly attributable to the policy. A business-as-usual model is not 
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additional. Instead, a project must go above and beyond what is common practice, or what 
would have happened without the policy.  
 Why would you pay someone to do something they were going to do anyway? 
Essentially, this is the logic behind the additionality criterion. It is important to keep the big 
picture of cap and trade in mind here. In creating an offset, the ARB is allowing an entity in 
California to continue polluting with the implicit understanding that some forest somewhere 
else in the US is sequestering the carbon from that firm. If a forest that would have been 
doing that anyway is now credited, no emission reductions have occurred. The cap is 
undermined, and the legislation has caused no actual change.  
 
1.5 Registering a Project 
This policy as well as the process of verification involves many different 
stakeholders. It will help to start at the micro-level of one project landowner and work 
outward through the process to understand all the different players involved. Although this 
overview is broad, it will help to provide context for understanding barriers faced.  First, a 
landowner may be interested in managing his or her forest through ARB’s system in order to 
earn offset credits. He or she would contact a developer (or perhaps a developer might 
contact a landowner) for some initial tests and a site visit. The developer would then work to 
calculate the baseline for the project. This is the initial stocking level at the start of the 
project. Carbon stocks must increase in comparison to the baseline to be viable. At this time 
the project would be listed on a registry, a public database for public transparency. Next, a 
verification body would conduct a site assessment and then either approve of or disagree with 
the developer’s calculations. The verification body acts as a neutral third party. Finally, if the 
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verification body approves of the calculations, the project earns credits from the ARB. The 
developer generally handles the selling of these credits. Figure 2 overviews the steps 
involved in registering a project. The top row displays the steps for a generic project while 
the bottom row displays one real-world example.  
Figure 2: Process of Registering a Forest Carbon Offset Project 
 
  
 
1.6 Stakeholders 
Various groups go through the process of registering their forests and earning offset 
credits to create the supply side of the carbon market. Suppliers include owners of family 
forests, Native American tribes, and large-scale corporate landowners such as Sierra Pacific 
Industries.  Others are timber companies who invest in their own forests as a way to both 
ensure the future of the company and to diversify their portfolios. Corporations that protect 
their forests and enter the carbon market maintain the added benefit of advertising their 
apparent environmental good deeds to their customer base and shareholders.  
Many projects come from non-profit groups such as land trusts and community 
groups interested in preserving local or community forests. However, some projects come 
from surprising sources, including the Walt Disney Company and General Motors. Although 
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not mandated to comply, in 2013, the Walt Disney Company received an award for its 
dedication to restoring forests, after investing 30 million dollars in global forest projects. 
Other projects include cities and towns from across the nation, such as the City of Arcata in 
California.   
 
1.7 Carbon Offset Registries 
The Carbon Action Reserve (CAR) is the largest carbon offset registry with 71 ARB 
compliant projects listed as of July 2015.  Begun as the California CAR in 2001, the Reserve 
helped over 400 businesses, organizations, and government agencies calculate and report 
their GHG emissions all under a voluntary framework. It was approved as an ARB registry in 
December 2012. It is based in Los Angeles, California. The ARB’s methodology protocol 
was modeled off of CAR’s protocol.  
The American Carbon Registry (ACR) is another ARB approved registry with 18 
ARB compliant projects. It was approved December 2012. Headquartered in Arlington, 
Virginia, it operates to “create confidence in the environmental and scientific integrity of 
carbon offsets in order to accelerate transformational emission reduction actions” (American 
Carbon Registry, n.d). It also maintains a publicly accessible database of proposed, ongoing, 
and completed projects.  
Approved in August 2014, the third option in choosing a registry is the Verified 
Carbon Standard (VCS) registry. The VCS operates out of Washington D.C. and, like the 
other registries, provides a neutral site for a marketplace for credit buying and selling.  It, 
however, does not yet have active forest projects registered.  
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2. Literature Review 
 The merits of forest offset programs are still in healthy debate among environmental 
policy scholars and scientists. The rules by which projects are evaluated, and by extension 
the participation rules themselves (i.e., protocols) are “murky and mired in controversy” 
(Gray and Edens 2008). Credibility is the main concern. As scholars note, the offset program 
and its protocols must “provide inexpensive and standardized approaches to forest carbon 
accounting that are not prone to dishonest handling” (Fahey et al. 2010).  The California 
forest carbon offset program is an attempt at this.  
 In a review of ten protocols, including eight voluntary and two compliance, Richards 
and Huebner (2012a) found that voluntary protocols would need to be improved before 
entering into the compliance setting. Among different protocols, consensus does not yet seem 
to have been reached on the matter of permanence and exactly how to define additionality 
and baselines. This makes a comprehensive market with low transaction costs difficult. They 
also critique the verification process, calling it a “checklist of inputs” rather than an 
“independent confirmation of estimations” (2012b, 423). As Richards and Huebner note, low 
transaction costs is one of the advantages of the offset approach to climate change mitigation.  
 Oliver (2013) also questions the legitimacy of carbon offsets, pointing out that forest 
offset calculations rely on a number of assumptions that are based on rudimentary data. 
Unlike reading a meter at a coal fired power plant, “reading” a forest is much more difficult, 
and requires experts who still must make professional judgment calls. Trees are part of 
living, growing ecosystems that are ever changing. Calculating the amount of carbon stored 
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in them at any one time is challenging, costly, and likely inaccurate. Furthermore, 
environmentalists raise issues of environmental justice, as polluters are able to continue 
polluting and simply pay forest landowners so they can continue their habits.   
  
 
2.1 Payments for Ecosystem Services  
As a market-based method of conservation, the concept of carbon offsetting can be 
contextualized as a payment for an ecosystem service (PES). An ecosystem service is any 
benefit that humans derive from natural ecosystems. Carbon sequestration, then, is an 
ecosystem service because it contributes to the human effort to decrease or mitigate 
emissions that contribute to climate change.  In the case of forestry, a landowner would be 
monetarily compensated for the services (i.e., carbon sequestration) his land provides to the 
general public.  A more specific definition is provided by Wunder (2005, 3) in which PES is  
“a voluntary transaction where a well-defined environmental service is being ‘bought’ by a 
service buyer from a service provider if and only if the service provider secures provision 
(conditionality)”. In the case of California’s market, landowners within the continental US 
may voluntarily provide carbon sequestration to entities regulated under the compliance 
market if and only if the service provider (landowner) registers his project to one of the three 
eligible registries.  
 The theory behind PES is based on the rationale that market failures cause an 
undersupply of the ecosystem service, so valuing and paying for these services will help 
encourage their provision (Engel, Pagiola, and Wunder 2008). PES systems work well when 
the service is a pure public good/service, such as the case with carbon sequestration. PES has 
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gained popularity in both actual practice and as buzzword in the past 15 years. Their main 
promise, like other market-based approaches to environmental problems, is cost-efficiency. 
However, PES is not a silver bullet as not all environmental problems work well in the PES 
context.  The design characteristics of each specific program, as well as the social, economic, 
and political contexts in which they operate, also matter. Muradian et al. (2013) caution that 
an over-reliance on payments for ecosystems services as a win-win solution could lead to 
ineffective outcomes.  
 Despite the caution scholars advocate, they also offer useful suggestions. Daniels 
(2010) notes that until there is greater demand for credits, thus boosting their price at market, 
landowners will be unlikely to want to sell. The government can help create that demand by 
passing stricter regulations on industry and regulating more industries under the program. 
Stephan and Paterson (2012) remind us that these markets are inherently political, lest we 
imagine that these markets are strictly based on accurate calculations. The establishing of 
baselines, which essentially determines how many credits a landowner could earn and 
whether a project is even viable is more complicated than it may appear. Often factors that 
contribute to the baseline go unexamined. Exactly what is defined as the baseline, whether it 
is static or dynamic or recent or historic depend on the program and may be left up to 
interpretation (Richards and Huebner 2012a). It is the combination of many actors, perhaps 
doing “calculations of interest” who are operating within the norms and practices of the 
organizations for whom they work (Stephan and Paterson 2012, 553).  
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2.2 Landowner Participation in Carbon Markets 
 Research shows that there are a variety of reasons people choose to participate in 
voluntary environmental markets (Kerchner and Keeton 2015; Markowski-Lindsay et al. 
2011; Schirmer and Bull 2014). Strong indicators include the belief that they are doing an 
environmental good and the sense of altruism that goes along with that, a desire to protect 
their land for future generations, and a belief in climate change (Schirmer and Bull 2014). 
Non-profit environmental groups such as land trusts and recreation areas share many of these 
same reasons. Businesses differ in their reasoning including a desire to diversify their 
portfolios, meeting corporate sustainability goals, and a desire to project (whether founded or 
not) an image of environmentalism to consumers.  
 While motivations are important to understand how to better develop a policy and 
how to recruit additional participants, understanding the barriers that groups face in trying to 
go through the process of earning carbon credits is also vital to ensuring continued support 
and success of the policy.  
 Markowski-Lindsay et al. (2011) studied barriers to landowner participation in carbon 
markets in Massachusetts using a mail survey. The survey presented four different 
hypothetical scenarios and asked landowners to rank them and whether they would be 
interested in participating in each. They found that there would be little interest in the 
programs. The main factors influencing the low rates of participation are additionality, early 
withdraw penalties, and contract length with respondents being more likely to participate in 
programs with no additionality requirement, no withdraw penalties, and shorter contract 
length. Similarly, Kerchner and Keeton (2015) look at the break-even points for small 
landowners and participation in California’s regulatory forest carbon market by examining 
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25 real properties in the northeastern United States. They found that the point of viability is 
about 1,480 acres. This is a problem as the average northeastern landowner owns less than 50 
acres (Butler 2008).  
 In following this strain of literature, Galik and Cooley (2012) find that different rules 
and accounting systems yield different results. Further, project accounting may have more 
influence on a project relative to business-as-usual, than carbon price or timber price. If the 
calculations are inherently political (Stephan and Paterson 2012) and accounting matters, a 
variety of results could occur on the same parcel of land. 
   
 
2.3 Factors Influencing Participation in Conservation Programs  
 Researchers recognize that at a number of landowner characteristics shape the 
decision to participate in conservation programs (Galik and Cooley 2012; Galik, Murray, and 
Mercer 2013; Markowski-Lindsay et al. 2011); yet policymakers may not really consider 
landowner characteristics when writing the policy. Fischer and Charnley (2010) note that 
nonindustrial family forests differ from large scale industrial forests in three major areas: 
values, ecological knowledge, and risk perception. Family forest owners also tend to have 
different goals for how they manage their land with a preference toward promoting habitat 
and biodiversity (Charnley, Diaz, and Gosnell 2010); they are also less likely to have a 
management plan as only 4% of family forest owners in the US do (Butler 2008).  
Finland, Sweden, and other Nordic countries have a strong record of voluntary 
environmental programs. Many of the studies on this topic come from that region. For 
example, Korhonen, Hujala, and Kurttila (2013) observe family forest owners in Finland and 
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their adoption of the voluntary program METSO which protects biodiversity by paying 
landowners to maintain their diverse, wooded lands. They applied Rogers’ five 
characteristics affecting adoption of a policy to the METSO program: relative advantage, 
observeability, compatibility, trialability, and complexity. Rogers’ five characteristics of 
policy adoption are relevant to the analysis of the supply side of California’s Air Resources 
Board forest carbon offset policy.  
 Relative advantage refers to whether the new policy is likely to be perceived as an 
advantage over the current system. While this may be measured in economic terms, it may 
also be considered in terms of social advantage and convenience. The forest carbon offset 
policy provides a high degree of relative advantage. The traditional method of earning money 
from owning a forest was to harvest it as timber. This new policy provides an alternative to 
that management technique.  
 Compatibility refers to how well the new model meshes with the traditional way of 
thinking. Not only does this refer to business models and methods, but also to the values and 
norms of a social system. Those inclined toward a more traditional method of forest 
management could be turned away by the 180-degree turnaround in management technique. 
Moving from harvesting trees as the primary source of income in a forest to actively 
protecting those same trees seems inherently confusing and at odds. A shift in the way 
foresters and owners think about their forests is required for this policy to succeed. Managing 
for carbon is more likely to occur if it is complementary to a landowner’s goals (Charnley, 
Diaz, and Gosnell 2010).  
 Complexity should be diminished. Complexity refers to the difficulty in interpreting 
and implementing a policy. The easier the conceptual foundations behind a new policy are to 
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understand, the more likely it is to be adopted faster. While the basic notion of carbon 
offsetting is easily understood, the details of it become highly complex very quickly. Wright, 
Beddoe, and Danks (2009) found that program complexity alone is a barrier for some 
landowners. Higher-level mathematics are required to fully understand how both the science 
behind carbon offsetting and the market value of the offsets function. However, look-up 
tables and prepared spreadsheets do aid implementation. A business that is already in the 
business of forestry has a distinct advantage in this regard. For example, a trained forester 
would have the knowledge to calculate baseline carbon stocks. However, siblings who 
inherited land from their parents might not have the expertise to understand the complexities 
of the policy. This is a barrier to nonprofits and family owned forests. Striking a balance 
between creating a policy that is complex enough to ensure real, additional, verifiable credits 
while at the same being simple enough for educated suppliers to understand is the key.  
 Observeability is the idea that policy changes or new ideas that are highly visible are 
more likely to spread than hidden ones. This is a problem consistently faced by those who 
work in the energy sector who seek to increase energy efficiency. Often the changes are 
technological or occur during the building of new structures or retro-fitting older ones. 
Because the changes are not highly observable, people are unaware they are occurring and so 
are less likely to adopt the innovation or new policy. This is part of the reason some of these 
energy efficient buildings have been granted LEED certified status and display a placard on 
their walls. Observeability in the case of forest offsets presents a unique situation. Often, vast 
swaths of forests are located where people are not. Further, even if a forest is preserved 
through this policy, there is no indication of this on public signs on the side of the road. 
There is a great likelihood that the general public is not even aware of this policy.  
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 Finally, trialability refers to the degree to which a given policy or innovation can be 
experimented with on a limited basis. The easier it is to try something with limited 
consequences, the more likely it is to be adopted. In the case of the forest carbon offset 
policy, there is rather low trialability, at least with registering projects to be operated under 
the California compliance market. However, other voluntary carbon markets existed before 
the AB32, which could be viewed as test beds or natural experiments in carbon offsetting. A 
project could start out in a voluntary registry such as the CAR and then transfer over to be in 
compliance with the mandatory standards. These are known as early action projects.3  
  Research suggests that small family landowners differ from large corporate 
landowners in their motivations for land use. Small family landowners also face different 
challenges to entry in the forest carbon offset market. Therefore, two research questions 
emerge: What are the barriers landowners face in registering a forest offset project under 
California’s forest offset project protocol? and What are the motivations landowners have in 
participating in California’s forest offset program?  
  
																																								 																					
3An early action project is a voluntary offset project that has been issued offset credits by an approved voluntary 
registry between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2014. These projects originated in the voluntary market and 
are transitioning to the compliance market.  
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3. Methods 
I employed a mixed-method approach to determine the barriers to participation in 
forest offset projects. First, I read the protocols. Next, I conducted interviews with experts in 
the field and with participants in the market such as landowners, verifiers, developers, and 
registry representatives. This provided insight impossible to garner from simply reading the 
protocols themselves. These experts understand the day-to-day details of forest carbon 
offsetting or have been through the process of registering their own land.  Using Markowski-
Lindsay et al. (2011) as a model, I administered a survey to likely participants with specific 
questions targeting the reasons they withdrew from the program. One question asked about 
their initial motivations in deciding to participate.  A final, separate survey was administered 
to those still involved in the program and who have projects registered with CAR.  
 
3.1 Understanding the Forest Offset Project Protocol   
The first step in understanding the complexity of the forest offset program was to read 
the protocols that dictate exactly what the program entails. The protocols define the different 
types of projects, set standards for measuring and calculating baselines, and lay out the rules 
for the timelines of verification. Although there are many protocols worldwide, I narrowed 
the focus to include only those eligible for and compliant with the Air Resource Board’s 
policy. These are the “Compliance Offset Protocol US Forest Projects” adopted November 
14, 2014 and created by the Air Resources Board, and the “Forest Project Protocol (FPP)” 
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adopted November 15, 2012 and created by the Climate Action Reserve. At this time, these 
are the only two eligible, approved protocols that meet ARB’s standards.  
 The protocols are very technical and written specifically for professional foresters. It 
is highly doubtful that any landowner would read these documents. And, while both 
protocols follow the same general logic, there are slight differences in some of the methods 
of calculation of carbon credits. 
 
3.2 Interviews 
Interviews with diverse stakeholders were held to discover the experiences each had 
related to forest offset projects participating in California’s carbon market. Initially, contacts 
were discovered through CAR’s online database of projects. Each project must submit an 
application for listing a project. The forms include the name of the offset project operator or 
the authorized project designee, as well as their email addresses. The form also provides 
details about the land such as whether it is publically or privately owned, its location, and 
information about the landowner.   
A total of 19 e-mail requests were sent out, and 6 interviews actually occurred 
between June and July 2015. At least one representative from each category of the process 
was interviewed. For example, an expert, landowner, developer, verifier, and registry 
representative were all interviewed. It was important to hear from representatives from each 
stage of the process for balanced results. All interviews except one were held over the phone 
and lasted between 15-40 minutes; one organization submitted its responses through email. 
They were audio recorded to ensure accuracy in reporting. Questions were open-ended and 
interviewees were generally eager to have their stories told. They often veered off track, 
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offering their own solutions to climate change by suggesting policies unrelated to forest 
offsets. Brining them back on track was a challenge.  
The other method of discovering contacts was through colleagues of the research 
team. These people, having had a personal connection with Appalachian State, were more 
responsive. Then, the snowball technique was used to find other people willing to be 
interviewed. The interview questions are attached in the Appendix.   
 
3.3 Surveys 
 Two separate surveys were administered through the online software system Qualtrics 
from May though July 2015 to two different target groups: participants and non-participants 
in the forest offset projects registered under California’s forest offset protocols.  
3.3.1 Survey 1: Non-Participants  
 For survey 1, the targeted audience was those individuals or entities who had started 
the process of registering a project, but did not follow through with the commitment.  
Earning credits and entering the carbon market is a multi-step process that often takes many 
months. The goal in hearing from this sub-group was to determine some barriers that they 
faced in going through the process. Some problem or barrier caused members of this group, 
after having initially invested at least some time and money into the project, to cease 
participating. Determining that major barrier that could not be overcome was the aim of the 
survey.  
 Sami Osman of the Climate Action Reserve (CAR) was instrumental in assisting with 
the survey administration. From the CAR registry’s database, he collected the names and 
email addresses of people meeting the desired criteria: were “listed” or “registered.” I sent 
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him a link to the survey and he sent it via Qualtric’s email system to 89 contacts. Of those 89, 
14 submitted a response to the survey. However, 10 of these were incomplete responses. 
Technically, Qualtrics codes this as a response even though many of these “submissions” 
were left completely blank. This left a total of four legitimate, complete surveys. Survey 1 is 
found in the Appendix.  
3.3.2 Survey 2: Participants  
 The second survey was sent to 29 project owners registered with the Carbon Action 
Reserve registry. The criteria for this survey was the following:  
1. Must be registered with CAR’s registry and listed online as of July 13, 2015.  
2. Must be a forest project.  
3. Must be ARB eligible (i.e., project has an ARB identification number). 
4. Must not be an early action project.  
5. Must have associated documentation that is available to the public (i.e., live links, 
files available to be downloaded) 
In some cases, Offset Project Operators (OPO) (those filing out the submission form) would 
also list an authorized project designee, generally a colleague. In the case where there were 
two names listed for the same project, both contacts were retained as hearing from two 
different people involved in the same project would not be detrimental. There were 51 unique 
projects listed. Finally, some developers were listed as the OPO for more than one project. 
To avoid sending multiple emails to the same contact, duplicates were removed. This brought 
the total number of unique names and e-mail addresses to 29. Of these 29 contacted, four 
have started the survey and one respondent has completed it. The survey instrument is 
available in the Appendix.   
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4.  Results 
 
4.1 Findings from the Interviews 
 Because the scope of the interviews included a wide range of actors involved, they 
focused on different types of barriers from a variety of perspectives. This subsection provides 
the findings and insights gained from the stakeholder interviews.   
 When asked about barriers, or roadblocks that cause landowners’ worry, respondents 
often mentioned the 100-year time commitment for project participation. One landowner 
said, “nobody in their right mind” would encumber their land for 100 years, especially in 
such an unstable carbon market. Developers and verifiers seemed to agree. Every individual 
who was interviewed mentioned the lengthy contract at some point in the conversation, with 
many reiterating the fact that a 100-year verification and reporting commitment is a major 
barrier to project participants. One verifier, reporting on conversations with landowners, 
expanded on it, wondering with concern what would happen to the land when they died and 
whether they would want to tie up their children in a contract with the State of California.  
Table 1 highlights key points from each interview.  
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Table 1: Comments from interviewees illustrating key barriers to participation 
Ident
ifier 
Stakeholde
r Type 
100-year time commitment Barriers 
A Expert “Can buy their way out, one 
would need to look really 
carefully at the penalty to see 
if it’s really a disincentive” 
• “It all has to do with the value 
of the credits”  
 
B Landowner “Nobody in their right mind” • “A million problems”  
• “Huge fiasco” 
• Trouble finding an American 
Forestry Association certified 
forester 
  
C Developer -Length of time commitment 
has proved most challenging 
for landowners 
• “Some owners are less willing 
to sign on to a legally binding 
agreement with the state of 
CA” 
• Sequential sampling 
requirement overly stringent  
• Many strong projects “languish 
in ARB’s queue” 
• “If baselines are set too high, 
many potential projects will not 
be viable for participation” 
D Verifier “Number 2 reason for 
withdraw for small and 
medium landowners” 
-Don’t know what’s going to 
happen in next 10 years, let 
along the next 100.  
• Some areas are already under 
SFC or SFI certification, but 
not the entirety of the project 
areas, which causes problems 
• “If they are currently managing 
their land in a sustainable way, 
meeting the additionality 
criteria could be difficult”  
• “If the review isn’t perfect, you 
have to do it again” 
E Registry 
Representati
ve  
“Worrisome to landowners”  • Developers that don’t have 
background get caught up in 
the details of inventory 
• Potential projects in AK are 
excluded 
 
 Both the verifier and the project developer mentioned that sequential sampling 
requirements for verification are overly burdensome. According to them, these requirements 
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are both costly and timely. The verifier estimated that these costs average about 25% of the 
total cost of a project. Furthermore, as the verifications require professional foresters to 
“walk the land” and examine the forest very thoroughly, high acreage projects are even more 
costly. And, as one verifier said, “if the review isn’t perfect, you have to do it again.”  
 The verifier and landowner also mentioned the problem of competing environmental 
programs. The landowner was researching placing his or her land in the EPA’s Wetlands 
Restoration Program and was having difficultly meeting the standards required by both 
projects. The verifier also mentioned the problem of Forest Stewardship Council  (FSC) and 
Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI) certified lands, noting that all acreage within the project 
area had to be certified if some part of the forest was. This is proving difficult for some 
projects that now have the added cost of meeting two sets of criteria.  
 The registry representative mentioned that project developers are looking to 
Appalachian forests as diverse, deciduous forests that would be excellent candidates for this 
policy. Finally, according the registry representative, carbon finance has the potential to aid 
rural development, in addition to mitigating climate change.   
 
4.2 Survey Results 
 Despite the very low response rate of the surveys, the responses they did garner are 
interesting in their own right and worthy of reporting. Including incomplete submissions, the 
response rate for survey 1 was 15.7%; excluding incomplete responses it was 4.5%. For 
Survey 2, the response rate for completed surveys was 3.4%. Table 2 displays the five survey 
responses, including motivations for joining initially. The last column displays barriers which 
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the respondent identified as “important” or “very important.” Respondent 4 only answered a 
few questions, but is nevertheless included in the analysis.  
Table 2: Characteristics of survey respondents and motivations (n=5) 
Sur
vey 
ID 
Nu
mbe
r 
Participa
nt or 
Non-
Participa
nt 
Acreage State Type of 
Project 
Ownership Role Motivation 
1 Non-
Participan
t 
Less than 
500 acres 
WA , 
OR 
Reforestation Large 
Corporate 
Landowner 
Landowner To benefit from 
the sale of carbon 
allowances 
and/or offsets 
2 Non-
Participan
t 
500-
1,000 
acres 
n/a Improved 
Forest 
Management 
Land Trust Landowner Financial return 
to support 
organization 
conservation 
mission 
3 Non-
Participan
t 
Less than 
500 acres 
n/a Reforestation Large 
Family 
Landowner 
Project 
Developer 
Alternative 
Revenue 
Generation 
4 Non-
Participan
t 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
5 Participan
t 
Over 
2,000 
acres 
CA Improved 
Forest 
Management 
Tribal Authorized 
Project 
Designee 
Forest 
management for 
tribal benefits 
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Table 3: Survey respondents and reported barriers 
Survey 
ID 
Number 
Participant 
or Non-
Participant 
Barriers: Selected important 
or very important 
Other Comments 
1 Non-
Participant 
• Initial Inventory Costs 
• Administrative effort 
and/or costs 
• Reporting (verification) 
timelines 
• Overall costs exceeded 
potential benefits 
• “Difficulty understanding 
why the organization 
would want to be so 
exclusive” 
2 Non-
Participant 
• n/a • n/a  
3 Non-
Participant 
• Initial inventory costs 
• Administrative effort 
and/or costs 
• Reporting (verification 
timelines) 
• Uncertain market demands 
• Price of carbon 
• Expected number of 
credits 
• Risk of fire, drought, or 
other natural disaster,  
• Not compliant 
• Overall costs exceeded 
potential benefits 
• Not compliant 
• Other – verification costs 
• Inclusion of pre-existing 
brush in baseline 
• “Cost of verification that 
was excessive for this 
small project.  Cost of this 
200 acre project was 
nearly the same as for 
projects of several 
thousand acres.” 
4 Non-
Participant 
• Administrative effort 
and/or costs 
• Reporting (verification 
timelines) 
• Uncertain market demands 
• Price of carbon 
• Expected number of 
credits 
• Risk of fire, drought, or 
other natural disaster,  
• Not compliant 
• Other – arbitrary staff 
interpretation 
• Verification costs 
exceeded the value of any 
carbon allowances for the 
first decade. 
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5 Participant • Administrative effort 
and/or costs 
• Monitoring requirements  
• Reporting requirements 
• Verification requirements 
• Price of carbon  
• Difficulty in working with 
a government agency 
• Initial inventory costs 
• Lengthy review period at 
ARB cause delays 
• n/a 
 
 However, it is likely that the five (combined participants plus non-participants) 
respondents are fairly representative of the larger population in many facets (Table 2). Table 
4 displays 39 projects with the same criteria as those invited to take Survey 2.  However, 
only 29 of these projects were invited because some Offset Project Operators (OPOs) were 
listed on multiple projects. To avoid inviting someone to take the survey twice, repeated e-
mails were deleted. Tables 2 and 4 allow for comparison between survey respondents and the 
larger population of forest carbon offset projects.  
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Table 4: CAR registered forest offset projects (as of July 13, 2015) 
CAR ID 
Number 
Acreage State Type 
of 
Project 
Role Ownership 
CAR993 7,660 CA IFM APD Yurok Tribe 
CAR973 229,601 MI IFM APD Heartwood Forestland Fund IV 
CAR1173 7,659  KY IFM APD Berea College 
CAR1168 460  CA R OPO Sierra Pacific Industries 
CAR1167 5,971 CA R OPO Sierra Pacific Industries 
CAR1166 221 CA R OPO Sierra Pacific Industries 
CAR1165 921 CA R OPO Sierra Pacific Industries 
CAR1164 4,775 CA R OPO Sierra Pacific Industries 
CAR1163 654 CA R OPO Sierra Pacific Industries 
CAR1162 1,460 ME IFM APD Forest Carbon Partners, LP 
CAR1161 547 ME IFM APD Northeast Wilderness Land 
Trust 
CAR1160 4,000 VA IFM OPO The Nature Conservancy (TNC) 
holds easement and timber rights 
CAR1159 5,750 VA IFM OPO TNC holds easement 
CAR1147 11,090 VA IFM OPO TNC holds easement 
CAR1141 2,167 CA IFM OPO n/a 
CAR1140 18,008 CA IFM APD n/a 
CAR1134 10,209 SC IFM OPO Norfolk Southern Railway 
Company 
CAR1130 4,861 TN IFM OPO Brimstone Forest Company 
CAR1129 2,141 NH IFM OPO Northeast Wilderness Trust 
Corporation holds easement 
CAR1104 4,039 CA IFM APD GM Gabrych Family LP 
CAR1102 2,102 CA IFM APD New Forests – Forest Carbon 
Partners 
CAR1100 15,911 CA IFM OPO TNC 
CAR1099 13,913 CA IFM OPO TNC 
CAR1098 23,780 CA IFM OPO TNC 
CAR1095 23,780 CA IFM OPO Coastal Forestlands 
CAR1092 14,662 CA IFM OPO  Sierra Pacific Industries 
CAR1091 24,501 CA IFM OPO Sierra Pacific Industries 
CAR1090 18,960 CA IFM OPO Sierra Pacific Industries 
CAR1067 2,112 CA IFM OPO Berry Summit, LLC 
CAR1063 19,118 ME IFM OPO Downeast Lakes Land Trust 
CAR1062 3,982 MO IFM OPO n/a 
CAR1046 11,350 CA IFM OPO n/a 
CAR1041 16,941 CA IFM OPO Sierra Pacific Industries 
CAR1032 9,753 VA IFM OPO n/a 
CAR1028 19,296 ME IFM OPO GLS Woodlands, LLC 
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CAR1013 19,552 CA IFM APD Sustainable Conservation, Inc.  
CAR1006 113,460 CA IFM OPO Fruit Growers Supply Company  
CAR1109 3,7131 SC AC APD n/a 
CAR1094 520 WA IFM APD Nisqually Land Trust  
Key: IFM=Improved Forest Management, AC=Avoided Conversion, R=Reforestation 
 First, survey respondents represented the different role categories and included 
project developers, landowners, and authorized project designees. For most projects, the 
person filling out the initial submittal form was the Offset Project Operator (OPO). This is 
often the owner in fee of the land or the easement holder. Alternatively, the Authorized 
Project Designee (APD) may also submit this form acting on behalf of the landowner.  
 Second, types of projects were represented in what seems to be a fair proportion to 
actual projects (Tables 2 and 4). One interviewee mentioned that there are few avoided 
conversion projects approved because the standards guiding them are very strict, so this 
explains the absence of respondents with avoided conversion projects in this study. In fact, 
there is only one active avoided conversion project listed in the larger sample (Table 4). The 
majority of forest carbon offset projects are Improved Forest Management (IFM) projects at 
84% of projects in the larger population. Two out of five of respondents had IFM projects. 
Reforestation projects are overrepresented in the survey as only 15% of the larger population 
has reforestation projects (Table 4) but two out of five survey respondents had reforestation 
projects (Table 2). Notably, all reforestation projects in the larger population were in the 
same county in California and involved re-planting after a fire had decimated the forest.  
 Third, respondents to the survey may represent the typical type of landownership one 
would expect to see among current project participants. The category not represented is small 
family landowners, an expected result as both the literature (Charnley, Diaz, and Gosnell 
2010; Fischer and Charnley 2010) and interviewees suggest that small forest landowners face 
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the highest barriers to entry into the program. Small forest landowners may lack the expertise 
and forestry network necessary to register an offset project (Fischer and Charnley 2010; 
Korhonen, Hujala, and Kurttila 2013). Tribal ownership is overrepresented in the survey as 
there was only one within the larger population (Tables 3 and 4). Corporate ownership is 
accurately represented in the survey as about 48% of the larger population falls into this 
category and two out of five respondents were corporate landowners.   
 Finally, existing projects vary by the size of the project (acreage) its location 
(state)(Table 4). Projects ranged from a minimum of 221 acres to a maximum of 229,601 
acres. However, most projects fall in the 7,000 to 12,000 range (Table 4). The larger sample 
has more projects with higher acreage than the five survey respondents. Of the survey 
respondents (non-participants), two had projects under 500 acres. In the larger population, 
only two out of 39 projects were under 500 acres, which is supportive of the claim that 
project size is a barrier for landowners with small forests. The average project size, excluding 
the project over 200,000 acres, is 12,721 acres. There is a propensity towards projects located 
in California (59%). Other regions represented seem to occur in clusters with multiple 
projects occurring in Maine, New Hampshire, and Virginia. Washington, Missouri, 
Michigan, Kentucky, Tennessee, and South Carolina each have one project listed.   
 All four non-participants said that “overall costs exceeded potential benefits” of 
project participation. This was a very important factor in their reported decision to stop 
participating. Exactly what these costs were needs further examination, however, the same 
group also said “administrative effort and/or cost” was an important factor in the decision to 
stop participating (Table 3). Respondents also had the opportunity to expand open-endedly 
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on any of the questions and one person wrote “verification costs exceeded the value of any 
carbon allowances for the first decade.” 
 All of the respondents selected “neutral” for the question “How important was each 
of the following in your decision to stop participating: time frame of obligation?” However, 
this does not mean the timeframe should be discounted as a barrier. Participants would have 
known about the 100 years before signing the contract, so it may not be the cause of their 
withdraw from the program. Instead, it is likely that it was a feature that caused some 
concern and perhaps turned away those who did not even make it as far as listing a project. 
However, although they did not explicitly mention the 100-year time commitment as a 
barrier or problem, respondents were asked “What would have been an acceptable 
commitment participation period?” with a sliding scale of 0 to 100 years from which to 
select. Three respondents chose 50 years while one selected 100 years.  According to one 
interviewee, larger companies with a conservation objective are more accepting of the 100 
years, while smaller and medium sized landowners are more likely to balk.  
 Every survey respondent was asked about motivations for wanting to register their 
land initially. Their responses were as follows: 
• forest management for tribal benefits 
• to participate in the carbon offset/allowance markets, both for our own facilities and 
for outside sales of offsets for profit  
• financial return to support organization conservation mission  
• to benefit from the sale of carbon allowance and/or offsets 
• alternative revenue generation.  
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From these responses, it seems that revenue is the main motivator. The statement that one 
respondent sees carbon offsetting as an “alternative” form of revenue suggests that this was 
not the original intended land use and is still not yet the norm.  
4.3 Summary of Findings 
 The overarching barrier for respondents to both the interviews and surveys is cost. 
Reportedly, high transaction costs for entry (registry fees) combined with the high costs of 
sequential verification seem to prevent some from participating. Interviewees suggest that the 
100-year time commitment is too long a time period, especially in a market as unstable as 
carbon’s. Finally, competing non-complementary conservation programs appear to be a 
barrier for large corporate landowners.  
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5. Discussion  
5.1 Motivations 
Understanding the motivations of landowners for participating in forest offset projects 
is important for policymakers who want to understand low participation rates. It is unlikely 
that there will be widespread participation until there is federal climate change legislation 
that would drive up the demand for forest carbon offset credits (Charnley, Diaz, and Gosnell 
2010). The main motivator was the financial return from the sale of credits. Therefore, to 
entice more landowners into the program, the price of carbon would need to be higher. But, 
this presents a catch-22 because as more credits are issued, supply increases, demand 
decreases, and price falls. If landowners and experts were examining this from a truly 
rational-choice perspective, those already in the market would want to exclude others from 
entering to preserve the value of their product.  
5.2 Barriers 
 In a discussion of the barriers to participation, it is important to remember the goal of 
the policy. It may seem a strange notion, but some barriers are built into the project by 
design. The policy maintains rigorous standards not to exclude people arbitrarily (as some 
landowners seem to feel), but rather because the program dictates high standards to ensure 
that actual carbon mitigation is occurring. Of course, this goal walks a fine line: have too 
strict standards and you exclude those you may actually want in but have too loose standards 
and you approve people who are not actually mitigating additional carbon. These two 
problems can be viewed from a statistical lens as what Trexler, Broekhoff, and Kosloff 
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(2006) call “phantom reductions” (false positives) and “lost opportunities” (false negatives). 
Decrease the likelihood of one problem occurring; the other is likely to increase.  
 Therefore, barriers need to be understood in two distinct ways. First, there are 
purposeful barriers, or barriers that are designed consciously by the makers of the policy. 
Even labeling these “barriers” is misleading, however they are perceived as barriers by 
potential participants so I will retain the language. In fact, though, they are not so much 
barriers as eligibility requirements. These barriers are in place to avoid the problems of a 
Type 2 error. Second, legitimate barriers also exist. In this sense I mean barriers to be 
impediments to participation for truly additional projects. This can be compared to the 
occurrence of a Type 1 error.  
 Distinguishing between the two types of barriers proves challenging. In the following 
sections I discuss some of the barriers cited by interviewees and survey respondents. 
However, it is important to keep in mind that developers, and especially landowners may 
have a narrower view of the policy. What a landowner might see as a barrier, the 
policymaker may see as a conscious design characteristic to ensure the integrity of the policy. 
This is to suggest that a stakeholder’s position may influence what he or she experiences as a 
barrier. Nevertheless, all are barriers and will be discussed here. Barriers can be grouped into 
four categories: biophysical characteristics, design characteristics, market characteristics, and 
attitudinal and compatibility characteristics.  
5.2.1 Biophysical Characteristics  
 Biophysical characteristics refer to the land itself. The forest’s ability to sequester 
carbon depends on the type of trees on the site and the age of those trees. Another barrier 
here is location of the project. Forests in Alaska and Hawaii are currently ineligible for 
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entering the program. One interviewee noted that there was lots of interest in projects in 
Alaska, but they are waiting from the approval from ARB before developing a project.  
 A serious and often cited barrier is that a project’s baseline is too high. The forester 
has likely been managing his land in a sustainable way for some years, and there isn’t much 
room for improved forest management. Landowners perceive this as a barrier, yet it is truly 
an eligibility requirement written into the protocol to avoid approving projects that are not 
additional.  
 Landowners must have a rather large swatch of land to be a good candidate for the 
program. While there is no explicit mention of minimum acreage required for a project, the 
financial restraints of a small-scale project remain too burdensome for many. For example, 
the registry fees are fixed rate fees and do not function on a sliding scale. This means that a 
100 acre project would have to pay the same steep registry fee as a 10,000 acre project. This 
is a barrier to many small-scale, family-owned forests, especially in the East and South. This 
is significant because 62% of the privately owned forests in the US are family forest owners 
and 53% of family forestland is owned by people with more than 100 acres (Butler 2008). 
This is a large segment of potentially eligible forestlands that are excluded from the market. 
One verifier cited about 3,000 acres as the minimum threshold for a project to be profitable, 
thereby excluding many smaller family forests that are less than than 3,000 acres. This seems 
to be a large piece of the puzzle that is missing. 
5.2.2 Design Characteristics 
 Design characteristics refer to the details of the policy and the ways in which it was 
designed to operate. One design characteristic cited by interviewees (although not by survey 
respondents) was the 100-year time commitment. Signing a contract for three generations 
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into the future with the State of California seems to make many landowners balk. According 
to a verifier, this does not seem to be as much of an issue for large-scale corporate 
landowners who often have pre-existing long–term forestry plans, but it certainly causes 
concern among medium-sized and small landowners.  
 One recurring barrier among large-scale projects was the problem of competing 
conservation programs. The policy anticipated converting land that had already been in a 
conservation easement into the carbon market. It lays out specific guidelines about how to do 
this. However, other competing conservation/reforestation programs pose a problem for 
some. For example, interviewees mentioned at least four other conservation programs that 
their land was already involved in or certified by: the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), the 
Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI), the Forest Legacy Project, and the Wetlands Restoration 
Program (WRP).  For example, the SFI includes standards for certification that may not 
necessarily be in accordance with the criteria for carbon offset credits. The SFI is broader and 
includes measures for protecting water quality and biodiversity. However, it is now standard 
practice that paper companies be certified.  It is difficult or impossible for forest industry 
projects to meet both standards, so they are forced to choose, as found in this study.  
5.2.3 Market Characteristics 
 Some barriers to participation come from the carbon market itself. For some, the price 
of carbon is too low to justify going through with the project. The flip side of this coin is that 
the costs of joining the market are too high. There are steep up front transaction costs in 
registering a project. One interviewee cited this as the number one reason people cannot 
become involved and noted that verification fees are significant but start at the low end at 
25,000 dollars (US).  One expert estimated that a project of 100,000 acres would have 
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verification costs around 55,000 to 60,000 dollars (US) and registry fees at about 150,000 
dollars (US).  Others estimate project development between 125,000 and 200,000 dollars 
(US) (Jenkins and Smith 2013). While this example is at the upper end of project size, it 
provides a general idea about how costly a project can be. This finding is consistent with the 
literature that suggests that a fundamental constraint on family forest owners is the low price 
of carbon and the high cost of participating (Charnley, Diaz, and Gosnell 2010).  
Therefore, investors need to know how long they can expect to wait before seeing a 
return. With the price of carbon being unstable, and currently fairly low at 12 dollars (US) 
per ton of carbon dioxide, that return could take longer than investors are willing to wait.  
5.2.4 Attitudinal and Compatibility Characteristics 
Attitudinal factors refer to the landowner’s perception of what the land is used for and 
its inherent value.  A community’s social norms also play a role in shaping participation in an 
altitudinal sense as well. For example, Schirmer and Bull (2014) found that in parts of 
Australia where there is a strong tradition of farming, land is perceived to be less valuable if 
it is not being farmed. Fallow land, or land growing trees to harvest carbon, as two non-
traditional land uses, may be seen as inferior. This suggests that perhaps in the US context, 
where traditional farming is the social norm, harvesting carbon could face additional 
challenges.  
 Carbon finance could be used as a method of rural development. However, the social 
norms of some places in Appalachia dictate a mistrust of outsiders. There is a strong history 
of its people and land being exploited by outsiders (Eller 1982).  Therefore, this mistrust is an 
additional barrier developers must overcome in seeking out projects in certain parts of the 
country, including farmland in the Midwest and forests in Appalachia.  
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 Compatibility refers to how well the new management plan or program would mesh 
with the traditional methods of management. For example, can conservation easements easily 
be transferred to new property owners willing to follow the contract or easement terms? Can 
the owner’s forest management plan be adjusted without too high a cost in both time and 
money? These considerations regarding how a community or an individual responds to 
change are important in understanding the extent to which landowners participate in a 
voluntary program.  
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6. Conclusion 
6.1 Reflections 
 One limitation of this research was the small sample size. It is difficult to make 
generalizations with the limited number of respondents. One reason for the low response rate 
among the non-participants survey could be their frustration with the entire process. Perhaps 
they lost a significant amount of time and money on a project and the survey was a painful 
reminder of the experience.  Another reason could be that companies are hesitant to share the 
details of their plans and experiences for fear of losing money. Finally, some could worry 
that they might “say the wrong thing” and risk a reversal occurring.  
 Another limitation is the fact that only projects from one registry, the CAR, were 
examined. These projects could have had experiences unique only to the CAR. There is the 
opportunity for further research here using the same methods but with a different database, 
such as the ACR.  
 If I were to redesign this research project, I would differentiate early on between the 
property sizes of projects. When discussing barriers, interviewees almost always responded 
first with small-scale projects and then with large-scale projects, clearly differentiating 
between the two. It seems the barriers a landowner might face may very well be dependent 
on the size of his or her property. Furthermore, this distinction is often made by researchers 
who focus either on a) small family forests or b) large scale corporate forests (Charnley, 
Diaz, and Gosnell 2010; Fischer and Charnley 2010). Making this distinction in practical 
terms would be difficult in working with the CAR database with the projects that had been 
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removed, as that data would not have been available. Nevertheless, the differences between 
the two groups are important and should not be ignored. More could be discovered by 
addressing different questions to the different groups.  
6.2 Commentary 
People are imperfect and so too is policy. Even the most expertly written policy will 
be implemented by people who are motivated by their own interests or organizational 
incentives (Stephan and Paterson 2012). The policy process is inherently political and public 
programs are carried by both bureaucrats and professional foresters, who have different goals 
and earn their paychecks from different sources.  
  In the current political arena, passing climate change policy is no easy task. 
Fortunately, California has been able to design a system that has potential. Designing a 
policy that both successfully change behavior by incentivizing forest protection while at the 
same time disallows bogus projects from entering the market (to ensure the cap is an actual 
cap) is difficult. Carbon sequestration by forestlands is certainly one important component of 
a whole host of climate change solutions. Taking it as the silver bullet answer would be a 
mistake.  
 After setting the price floor, California has essentially stepped out of the market. The 
current price of carbon is about 12 US dollars per ton. In order for landowners to truly be 
incentivized to change their management plans and to enter this market, carbon must be 
valued as a commodity at a higher price. Of course, this could change in the coming years as 
the number of covered entities expands. Theoretically, the demand for credits would increase 
and the price they could fetch would also increase. However, if more and more forests are 
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certified and earning credits, there could be an overabundance of supply and the price could 
remain low. This remains to be seen. 
 However, there is potential here and the promise of making serious, significant 
climate change without crippling the economy, in fact at the same time enhancing it, makes 
cap and trade and carbon sequestration the most practical policies. Developing some type of 
evaluation criteria to judge the success of the policy is an important step. The forest carbon 
sequestration component of the umbrella cap and trade program almost functions as a 
separate program within the policy. That program also needs to be evaluated from a critical 
lens. Increasing the number of participants is not necessarily best for the overall goal of the 
policy: GHG mitigation.  
 As the threat of climate change becomes increasingly imminent and pressure on 
policymakers to take action increases, carbon markets around the world will be watching 
California. Its successes will be duplicated and its failures scrutinized, criticized, and 
improved upon in markets around the world. This research contributes to one component of 
the policy by examining the barriers to participation for different types of landowners and 
their motivations for participating in the first place.   
6.3 Recommendations 
 In making a recommendation to the ARB, I would advocate creating an aggregation 
protocol for small-scale landowners which would increase the number of participants and 
acres of protected land. The minimum acreage for a project seems to be about 3,000 acres or 
5,000 acres for a “comfortable” project. A large segment of both the population and forested 
acres is excluded from the market, calling into question issues of justice.  
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 Second, the ARB should consider ways to redesign the contract so that the time-
commitment is more manageable. Even foresters and those in forest management, who tend 
to have a further outlook than the finance field, seem to agree that 100 years is simply too far 
out for any meaningful plans. Survey respondents suggest 50 years as a reasonable contract 
length and interviewees were suggesting an even lower length at between 25 and 30 years. 
The ARB worries about the permanence criterion being met. This is a reasonable concern if 
they maintain the permanence standard, however, this in itself seems to be a problem. The 
regulation in essence defines permanence as 100 years, but that is not what this word means 
to the rest of the world. As long as verifiers are doing their calculations correctly and owners 
are earning true market price for their carbon, the age of the forest should not matter. It may 
make a difference to individual landowners, but at the national, aggregate levels those details 
wash out. From the perspective of the atmosphere there is no difference between 10 projects 
lasting 10 years or one project lasting 100 years. The ARB would do well to remove the 
standard, set a more manageable timeline, and avoid misleading people with a label that is 
not accurate.  
 Third, working to align with pre-existing conservation programs should be a goal of 
the ARB’s. This will be a challenge as projects have differing goals, but they seem to go 
hand-in-hand, and the ARB should work to accommodate those partnerships. They were able 
to successfully anticipate land being in conservation easements and had a section of the 
protocol dedicated to explaining the details of how a transfer would function. A similar 
transfer, or existence in both markets, could be worked into future renditions of the protocol.  
 Fourth, the sequential verification standard seems to be overly burdensome on 
landowners and verifiers. The process requires a significant amount of time in the field. 
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Because there are a limited number of certified foresters eligible to legally work on these 
projects, this could be preventing new projects from getting off the ground. The standard 
could be rewritten so that verification occurs less often, for example every eight years instead 
of every six. Another option is to employ a “looser” methodology and spot check in a less 
dense pattern. Of course, this opens up the policy to more criticism from environmentalists 
and those who worry that sequestration does not really do anything. Admittedly, with less 
stringent sequential verification standards, there is more room for error and abuse. However, 
this option should at least be considered as a compromise if entering more forests into the 
program is at least a peripheral goal.   
6.3 Future Research 
 While this research design provided good preliminary results, it leaves room for 
future research. First, CAR respondents may be facing fatigue so it would be wise to use a 
different database. The American Carbon Registry (ACR) is an excellent option. The same 
basic research design could be followed with projects registered with the ACR.  This would 
also provide data on whether barriers are similar across the registry or unique to just one of 
the registries. Making a clear distinction between large corporate owners and small family 
forests is also important in future work. Understanding that they operate under very different 
decision-making structures is important to keep in mind. They should be evaluated under two 
different research designs.  
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Appendix: Data Collection Instruments  
 Interview Questions for Project Developer 
1. Who initiates contact in the early stages of a project? Does you reach out to landowners, 
land trusts, and TIMOs or do they contact you? 
 a. How familiar are landowners with the details of the ARB or CAR protocol? 
 b. To what extent are you involved in helping design a project? 
 
2. What aspects of the ARB and CAR forest protocols (e.g., term-commitment, complexity, 
costs, etc.) have proven most challenging, or cause the most reluctance or angst, for project 
owners? 
 a. Do differences between the ARB and CAR protocols affect project owner 
 decisions? If so, in what ways? 
b. Do differences in how the ARB and CAR protocols treat the different project types 
(i.e. reforestation, improved forest management, or avoided conversion) affect project 
owner decisions? If so, which differences, and how are project owner decisions 
affected?  
 
3. In your experience, what parts of the ARB and CAR protocols tend to be the most 
problematic during verification, and how material to the quantification of GHG offsets are 
these problem areas? Please explain how or why these issues arise, and offer any ideas you 
may have regarding changes or clarifications that would help alleviate these issues. 
 
4. Are there other aspects of the ARB or CAR protocol or process that have affected the 
supply of forest offsets either positively or negatively? If so, which aspects, and how did the 
effect manifest? 
a. Are you aware of and forest sequestration projects that withdrew from participation 
in the CAR or ARB but continued to conduct the project activities? If so, why did 
they withdraw, and what, if any, changes to the protocols or program might have 
maintained their participation? 
b. Are you aware of any forest sequestration projects that withdrew from participation 
in the CAR or ARB and ceased conducting project activities? If so, why did they 
withdraw, and what, if any, changes to the protocols or program might have 
maintained their participation or supported continued project activities? 
 
5. How have the protocols and other requirements for carbon offsets changed over time? (e.g. 
become more clear, more complex, more difficult to put in practice) And do these changes, in 
your opinion, expand or contract the potential supply of forest offsets, affect the cost or risk 
of projects earning offsets, and provide a more reliable quantification of actual carbon 
sequestration compared to the approach prior to implementation of the change? 
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6. Have you seen a decrease or increase in the number of participants, potential participants, 
or parties interested in the program in recent years? 
 
7. How does the current market for carbon offsets impact property owners’ decisions to 
participate (or not) in the ARB offset program?  [future market prices, regulatory reversals, 
opportunity cost, transaction costs, other] 
 
8. Finally, what aspect(s) of the protocol or the market has the greatest impact on the number 
of offsets earned by a project? 
 
Interview Questions for Project Verifier 
	
1. What is your position at you company? How long have you been involved in this 
industry? 
2. Do you work directly with landowners?  
3.  How familiar are landowners with the details of the ARB or CAR protocol?  
4. What aspects of the ARB and CAR forest protocols (e.g., term-commitment, complexity, 
costs, etc.) have proven most challenging, or cause the most reluctance or angst, for 
project owners? 
5. Do differences between the ARB and CAR protocols affect project owner decisions? If so, 
in what ways? 
6. Do verifiers talk? 
7. Do differences in how the ARB and CAR protocols treat the different project types (i.e. 
reforestation, improved forest management, or avoided conversion) affect project owner 
decisions? If so, which differences, and how are project owner decisions affected? 
8. In your experience, what parts of the ARB and CAR protocols tend to be the most 
problematic during verification, and how material to the quantification of GHG offsets are 
these problem areas? Please explain how or why these issues arise, and offer any ideas 
you may have regarding changes or clarifications that would help alleviate these issues. 
9. Are there other aspects of the ARB or CAR protocol or process that have affected the 
supply of forest offsets either positively or negatively? If so, which aspects, and how did 
the effect manifest? 
10. Are you aware of and forest sequestration projects that withdrew from participation in the 
CAR or ARB but continued to conduct the project activities? If so, why did they 
withdraw, and what, if any, changes to the protocols or program might have maintained 
their participation? 
11.  How have the protocols and other requirements for carbon offsets changed over time? 
(e.g. become more clear, more complex, more difficult to put in practice) And do these 
changes, in your opinion, expand or contract the potential supply of forest offsets, affect 
the cost or risk of projects earning offsets, and provide a more reliable quantification of 
actual carbon sequestration compared to the approach prior to implementation of the 
change? 
12. Have you seen a decrease or increase in the number of participants, potential participants, 
or parties interested in the program in recent years? 
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13. How does the current market for carbon offsets impact property owners’ decisions to 
participate (or not) in the ARB offset program?  [future market prices, regulatory 
reversals, opportunity cost, transaction costs, other] 
   
 
Interview Questions for Experts  
1. Did you register a project?  
2. Did you work at all with a specific registry?  
3. Does Winrock run the ACR?  
4. Does you land have a forest management plan?  
5. Do you think the additionality component is overly burdensome for landowners?  
6. To what degree do you believe carbon offsets are a viable means of mitigating the effects 
of global warming?  
7. Describe your confidence in the carbon market.  
8. What is your opinion on the 100 year-time commitment?  
 
Interview Questions for Landowners  
1.What were some of the problems you faced?  
2.How did you first learn about California's carbon offset program?  
3.Do you have any previous experience with carbon credits? 
4.What is the current use of the land? Is any part of it harvested?  
5.How confident are you in the carbon market? 
6.Was the project deemed to be a poor financial decision? 
7.Did a field technician provide an estimate of your carbon stock?  
8.What ultimately caused you to decide NOT to go forward with the project?  
 
Interview Questions for Registry Representatives  
1.What is your role in the organization?  
2.How many years of experience do you have in carbon markets?  
3.What barriers do you see in the process for landowners?  
4.How often do you interact directly with landowners?  
5.Do you keep track of dropouts (i.e. people who have started the process of registering but 
dropped out?  
 
Survey for Non-Participants in Forest Offset Projects 
This survey is part of a study funded by the United States Forest Service (USFS) and 
Appalachian State University. The questions below relate to your involvement in the forest 
carbon offset program administered by California's Air Resources Board and the Climate 
Action Reserve. The responses will be used only in aggregate and any identifying 
information will be removed in the final report. We estimate that this survey will take no 
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more than 15 minutes to complete.  The results of this project will help to provide guidance 
to program administrators for future refinements. We thank you in advance for your 
participation in this research. Participation in this research is voluntary. You may choose not 
to participate or stop at any time with no consequences. If you have questions, contact Celina 
Szymanski at 828-262-6350 or Tatyana Ruseva, PhD, at 828-262-8238.  
 
This survey is designed to be answered with one project in mind. We recognize that one 
project developer may have more than one project that has been de-listed. Please fill out one 
survey per project. While we would love to have all of the projects represented in our data, if 
you need to limit your time commitment, please choose a project you feel is representative of 
the projects that you work with.  
 
Appalachian State University's Institutional Review Board has determined this research to be 
exempt from further review. By continuing on to the survey, you acknowledge you have read 
and agree to the descriptions and terms outlined in this consent form, and voluntarily agree 
to participate in this research.  
 
Q1 What is the name of the project?  
Q2 What was the CAR ID Number for this project? 
Q3 What is the name of your organization?  
Q4 In what capacity were you involved in this project? 
m Project Developer (1) 
m Landowner (2) 
m Authorized Project Designee (3) 
m Technical Consultant (4) 
m Other (5) ____________________ 
 
Q5 Initially, what was the reason you undertook the project?  
Q6 Which market were you intending to be a part of? (I.e. California's ARB, RGGI, etc.)  
Q7 Which protocol was the project operating under?  
m CAR Forest Project Protocol (1) 
m ARB Compliance Offset Protocol US Forest Projects (2) 
m Other (3) ____________________ 
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Answer:  If “Which protocol was the project operating under?” and CAR Forest Project 
Protocol Is Selected: 
Q7.1 Which version of the protocol was used? 
m Version 3.3 (adopted November 15, 2012) (1) 
m Version 3.2 (adopted August 31, 2010) (2) 
m Version 3.1 (adopted October 22, 2009) (3) 
m Version 3.0 (adopted September 1, 2009) (4) 
m Version 2.1 (adopted September 6, 2007) (5) 
m Version 1.0 (adopted June 13, 2005) (6) 
m Don't Know (7) 
 
Answer: If “Which protocol was the project operating under?” and ARB Compliance Offset 
Protocol US Forest Projects Is Selected: 
Q7.2 Which version of the protocol was used? 
m US Forest Projects (adopted October 20, 2011) (1) 
m US Forest Projects (adopted November 14, 2014) (2) 
m Don't Know (3) 
 
Q8 What type of project was listed?  
m Improved Forest Management (1) 
m Avoided Conversion (2) 
m Reforestation (3) 
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Q9 Approximately when was the project listed with the registry? 
Drop Down Menus: options 2004-2015  
Drop Down Menus: options January – December  
Q10 Approximately when was the project withdrawn from the registry?  
Drop Down Menus: options 2004-2015  
Drop Down Menus: options January – December  
Q11 What was the "ARB Project Status" when it was withdrawn from the registry?  
m Active ARB Project (1) 
m Active Registry Project (2) 
m Proposed Project (3) 
m Early Action Eligible (4) 
m Early Action Project (5) 
m Not ARB Eligible (6) 
 
Q12 What was your project's CAR status when it was withdrawn from the registry?  
m "New" (i.e. never appeared on registry) (1) 
m Verified (2) 
m Listed (3) 
m Completed (4) 
m Don't Know (5) 
m Other (6) ____________________ 
 
Q13 How would you describe the ownership of the land on which the project was being 
implemented?  
m Lands held in a trust / nonprofit organization (1) 
m Small Family landowners ( (2) 
m Large Family landowners (>1,000 acres) (3) 
m Timber Investment Management Organization (4) 
m Large Corporate landowner (5) 
m Other (please describe) (6) ____________________ 
 
Q14 What was the approximate acreage of this project?  
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m Less than 500 acres (1) 
m 500-1,000 acres (2) 
m 1,001 - 2,000 acres (3) 
m Over 2,000 acres (4) 
 
Q15 What was the single most important factor in the decision to stop participating?  
Q16 How important was each of the following in your decision to stop participating?  
 Not 
Important 
(1) 
Slightly 
Important 
(2) 
Neutral 
(3) 
Important 
(4) 
Very 
Important 
(5) 
Not 
Applicable 
(6) 
Time frame of 
Obligation (1) m  m  m  m  m  m  
Initial 
inventory 
costs (ex: legal 
costs) (2) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  
Administrative 
effort and /or 
cost (3) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  
Reporting 
(verification) 
timelines (4) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  
Uncertain 
market 
demand (5) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  
Price of 
carbon (6) m  m  m  m  m  m  
Expected 
number of 
credits (7) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  
Risk of fire, 
drought or 
other natural 
disaster (8) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  
Change in 
intended land 
use (9) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  
Overall costs 
exceeded 
potential 
m  m  m  m  m  m  
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benefits (10) 
Hesitance to 
work with a 
government 
agency (11) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  
Not Compliant 
(14) m  m  m  m  m  m  
Other - please 
explain (12) m  m  m  m  m  m  
Other - please 
explain (13) m  m  m  m  m  m  
 
Answer: If “How important was each of the following in your decision to stop participating?  
Timeframe of Obligation - Very Important Is Selected Or How important was each of the 
following in your decision to stop participating?  Timeframe of Obligation - Important Is 
Selected:” 
Q16.1. What would have been an acceptable commitment participation period?  
______ Years (1) [Sliding Scale of 0 to 100 years] 
 
Answer: If “How important was each of the following in your decision to stop participating?  
Price of carbon - Very Important Is Selected Or How important was each of the following in 
your decision to stop participating?  Price of carbon - Important Is Selected:” 
Q16.2 Approximately what would the price of carbon need to be in order for you to 
participate?  
______ Price per ton of Carbon (USD) (1) [Sliding Scale 0 to 100$, USD price per ton of 
Carbon] 
 
Q17 Please elaborate on any of the aforementioned that you feel were very important factors. 
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Q18 What were other factors that influenced your decision to stop participating?  
 
Q19 What would have made participation in the program more appealing?  
 
Q20 If you would be willing to be contacted for future research on this topic, please provide 
your email address below.  
Email Address (1) 
------End of Survey------ 
Survey for Participants in Forest Offset Projects 
A study funded by the United States Forest Service (USFS) and Appalachian State 
University examines motivations for participation in compliance forest offset projects.  The 
questions below relate to your participation in projects registered with the Climate Action 
Reserve (CAR) and/or California's Air Resources Board (ARB) compliance offset program.   
Your participation in this survey is very important and we greatly value your input and your 
time. All information will be used only in aggregate; thus, no one will be able to identify 
individual projects in the final report. The survey should take no more than 12 minutes to 
complete. Your participation is completely voluntary.  
 
The survey is designed to be answered with one project in mind. Please fill out one survey 
per project, choosing a project you feel is most representative of the projects you work with. 
The results will help inform future program refinements and assist program administrators. 
We thank you in advance for your participation in this research.  
 
Appalachian State University's Institutional Review Board has approved this research under 
study number 15-0162. By continuing on to the survey, you acknowledge that you have read 
and agree to the descriptions and terms outlined in this consent form, and voluntarily agree 
to participate in this research. If you have any questions or concerns, please contact Celina 
Szymanski at 828-262-6350 or Tatyana Ruseva at 828-262-8238.  
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Q1 What is the name of the forest offset project? 
Q2 What is the CAR ID Number for this project? 
Q3 In what capacity are you involved in this project? 
m Project Developer (1) 
m Landowner (2) 
m Authorized Project Designee (3) 
m Technical Consultant (4) 
m Other (5) ____________________ 
 
Q4 How would you describe the ownership of the land on which the project is located?  
m Lands held in a trust / nonprofit organization (1) 
m Small family landowner ( (2) 
m Large family landowners (>1,000 acres) (3) 
m Timber Investment Management Organization (4) 
m Large corporate landowner (5) 
m Other (please describe) (6) ____________________ 
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Q5 What was the main motivation for undertaking this project?  
Q6 Please indicate how influential each of the following has been in your decision to 
participate in a forest offset project.  
 Not at all 
influential 
(1) 
Slightly 
influential 
(2) 
Somewhat 
influential 
(3) 
Very 
influential 
(4) 
Extremely 
influential 
(5) 
Not 
applicable 
or don't 
know (6) 
Initial carbon 
stocking level 
(2) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  
Financial 
viability of 
project (3) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  
Property size 
(4) m  m  m  m  m  m  
Property 
location (5) m  m  m  m  m  m  
Price of 
carbon (6) m  m  m  m  m  m  
Market 
demand for 
carbon offsets 
(7) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  
Desire to 
mitigate GHG 
emissions (8) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  
Available 
financing for 
project 
development 
(9) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  
Existing 
forest 
management 
plan (10) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  
Desire to 
actively 
manage land 
(11) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  
Uncertain m  m  m  m  m  m  
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long-term 
monitoring 
and reporting 
costs (14) 
Other 
administrative 
costs (15) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  
A 100-year 
monitoring 
and reporting 
requirement 
(16) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  
Other - please 
explain (12) m  m  m  m  m  m  
Other - please 
explain (13) m  m  m  m  m  m  
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Q7 Please indicate the degree to which each of the following may have been a problem for 
your project thus far.  
 Not at all a 
problem 
(1) 
Minor 
problem 
(2) 
Moderate 
problem 
(3) 
Serious 
problem 
(4) 
Not 
applicable 
or don't 
know (7) 
Prefer not 
to answer 
(8) 
Initial 
inventory 
costs (i.e. 
costs of 
determining 
baselines) (1) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  
Administrati
ve effort and 
costs (i.e. 
registry fees) 
(2) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  
Monitoring 
requirements 
(3) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  
Verification 
requirements 
(4) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  
Reporting 
requirements 
(5) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  
Uncertain 
market 
demand (6) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  
Price of 
carbon (7) m  m  m  m  m  m  
Expected 
number of 
credits (8) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  
Risk of fire, 
drought, or 
other natural 
disaster (9) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  
Difficulty in 
working with 
a government 
m  m  m  m  m  m  
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agency (11) 
Lengthy 
review 
period at 
ARB delayed 
/ is delaying 
project (15) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  
Penalty for 
early 
withdraw or 
termination 
of project 
(13) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  
Other (10) m  m  m  m  m  m  
Other (14) m  m  m  m  m  m  
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Q8 What factors do you think would make participation in a forest offset project more 
appealing to forest owners? 
Q9 Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements.  
 Strongl
y 
disagre
e (1) 
Somewh
at 
disagree 
(2) 
Disagr
ee (3) 
Neithe
r agree 
nor 
disagre
e (4) 
Agre
e (5) 
Somewh
at agree 
(6) 
Strongl
y agree 
(7) 
Not 
applicab
le (8) 
The 
benefits of 
program 
participatio
n have 
outweighe
d the costs 
of 
participatio
n. (1) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
I am 
satisfied 
with the 
current 
price of 
carbon. (2) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
The 100-
year 
requiremen
t for 
project 
monitoring
, 
verification
, and 
reporting is 
a serious 
barrier to 
participatio
n in forest 
offset 
projects. 
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
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(3) 
 
 
Q10 In your opinion, what commitment period will make participation in a forest offset 
project more attractive to forest owners?  
______ Years (1) 
 
Q11 If you are willing to be contacted for a follow-up related to this research, please provide 
your email address and phone number below.  
Email Address (1) 
Phone number (2) 
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